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INTRODUCTION 
Each year, the global food and beverage industry, made up of food 
suppliers, manufacturers, and retailers, generates more than $5.7 trillion in 
the business of developing food and selling it for consumption.1 To maintain 
their profit level, agribusiness companies lobby the government, donating 
nearly $58 million to candidates for federal office in the 2010 election cycle 
alone.2  In a time when the health and safety of our food is called into 
question, one wonders who is protecting the interests of consumers.3 With the 
advent of Citizens United v. FEC, corporations are entitled to greater First 
Amendment protection than ever before, as the government is prohibited 
                                                        
* Mallorie A. McCue is a May 2012 graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School 
of Law. Prior to law school, Ms. McCue earned a B.A. in Public Relations and a B.A. 
in Women's Studies from the Pennsylvania State University, graduating with 
distinction. She would like to thank the entire staff of PJEPHL for their work on her 
note, as well as her family and friends for their unfaltering support and 
encouragement. 
1  IMAP, FOOD AND BEVERAGE INDUSTRY GLOBAL REPORT 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.imap.com/imap/media/resources/IMAP_Food__Beverage_Report_WEB_
AD6498A02CAF4.pdf. 
2 The CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, TOTALS BY SECTOR (2010), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/bigpicture/sectors.php?cycle=2010&bkdn=DemRep&sort
By=Rank (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
3  See THE CTR. FOR ECOLITERACY, FOOD, INC. DISCUSSION GUIDE 81 (2009), 
available at www.foodincmovie.com/img/downloads/foodinc_PDF_091008.pdf 
[hereinafter CTR. FOR ECOLITERACY]. 
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from making distinctions or imposing regulations based upon the identity of 
the speakers who are exercising their First Amendment rights.4 Additionally, 
the decision set forth that corporations have no cap on spending for the 
election or defeat of candidates.5 President Obama commented that the ruling 
"opens the floodgates for an unlimited amount of special interest money into 
our democracy . . . giv[ing] lobbyists new leverage to spend millions on 
advertising to persuade elected officials to vote their way—or to punish those 
who don't."6 
At the heart of the matter is our First Amendment right to free speech. 
The First Amendment includes guarantees that Congress will make no law 
prohibiting or abridging the exercise of freedom of speech, freedom of the 
press, or the petitioning of the Government for a redress of grievances. 
Corporations assert that their donations to candidates for public office are an 
exercise of their right to free speech and further their corporate speech.7 
However, whistleblowers insist that corporations are not individuals, and 
should not be protected as such; and that corporate contributions should be 
limited to protect against corruption.8 
This Note argues that with Citizens United, special interests such as 
agribusiness now wield the greatest political and economic power in history, 
allowing them to further drown individual free speech with agricultural 
disparagement statutes and lobbying.9 Private advocacy nonprofits rely on 
                                                        
4  Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus 
Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 
28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 550 (2010) (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election 
Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 882–83 (2010)). 
5 Id. at 572–73 (citing Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 919). 
6 President Barack Obama, President Obama Vows to Continue Standing Up to the 
Special Interests on Behalf of the American People, WEEKLY ADDRESS (Jan. 23, 
2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-
president-obama-vows-continue-standing-special-interests-behalf-amer. 
7 Rubin, supra note 4, at 579. 
8 Id. 
9 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 883 (2010). 
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voluntary donations to enhance the impact of individual voices on elections. 
Yet corporations can simply make a large, tax-deductible donation to their 
chosen candidate at a crucial moment in the election, saving or defeating the 
candidate and preserving their corporate interest.10  Paired with corporate 
practices that emphasize profits over the interests and welfare of the 
American people, such as utilizing agricultural disparagement statutes, 
industries such as agribusiness have been granted carte blanche to suppress 
individual free speech. With unlimited corporate funds flowing to favorable 
candidates, the ruling has the potential effect of suppressing public opinion 
by using corporate funding to further agricultural disparagement statutes. 
Section I will discuss commercial speech, food labeling, and the 
constitutionality of veggie libel laws, as well their effect of insulating 
agribusiness from criticism. Section II contains an analysis of Citizens United 
and its potential effect on agribusiness. Section III sets forth a proposed 
solution for dulling the impact of Citizens United with transparency, 
campaign finance reform and disclosure. 
I. COMMERCIAL SPEECH, FOOD LABELING AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF VEGGIE LIBEL LAWS 
A. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
Applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the First 
Amendment protects commercial speech from unwarranted governmental 
regulation.11 Under the First Amendment's free speech clause, citizens are 
entitled to seek out or reject certain ideas or influences without government 
interference or control.12 If a statute burdens free speech based on its content, 
the burden alone is not enough to render it per se unconstitutional, but the 
presumption of constitutionality usually afforded to congressional enactments 
                                                        
10 26 U.S.C. § 501 (2010). 
11 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 
(1980) (citing Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748, 761–62 (1976)). 
12 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). 
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is rebutted,13  making it presumptively invalid.14  The burden is on the 
government to rebut that presumption, and if the government does not meet 
this burden, the law is unconstitutional.15 
Commercial speech is speech done on behalf of a company or individual 
with the intent of making a profit such as advertising for the sale of goods and 
services16 or speech proposing a commercial transaction, and is generally not 
suspect if it is not misleading or related to unlawful activity.17  The 
Constitution generally provides less protection for commercial speech than 
other constitutionally protected expression.18 Rather, the extent of protection 
is based on the nature of the expression and the nature of the governmental 
interests served by the regulation of that speech.19 As established in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 
courts considering regulations affecting commercial speech must consider 
(1) whether the government's interest in restricting the speech is substantial, 
(2) whether the regulation in question is narrowly tailored to directly advance 
the government's interest, and (3) whether the regulation is more extensive 
than necessary to serve that interest.20 If a governmental organization seeks to 
restrict commercial speech, it is not required to employ the least restrictive 
means conceivable, but, according to the Central Hudson test, it must 
demonstrate that the harms it asserts are real, that the challenged regulation 
                                                        
13 Id. 
14 Id. (citing R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 
(1992)). 
15 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 817 (2000). 
16 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002); Bd. of Tr. of 
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 482 (1989); Bad Frog Brewery, Inc. v. N.Y. 
State Liquor Auth., 134 F.3d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Bell, 238 F. 
Supp. 2d 696, 703 (M.D. Pa. 2003), aff'd, 414 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2005). 
17 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. 
18 Id. at 563. 
19 Id. 
20 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 482 (1995) (citing Central Hudson, 447 
U.S. at 563–55). 
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directly advances the asserted interest,21 and that the restriction will in fact 
"alleviate [the harms] to a material degree."22  Additionally, the Court 
"presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at 
all."23 In Rubin v. Coors Brewing the Court reaffirmed the Central Hudson 
test, holding that the government needed to produce actual evidence, rather 
than mere speculation or conjecture, to assert that its regulation directly and 
materially advanced its goals, and was no more extensive than necessary.24 In 
Rubin, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's ruling that 27 U.S.C. 
§ 205(e)(ii), which prohibited beer labels from indicating alcohol content, 
was an impermissible infringement of commercial free speech. 25  In its 
analysis of the labeling prohibition under Central Hudson, the Court held that 
the government had a substantial interest—the prevention of beer "strength 
wars"—to justify the labeling ban.26 However, the ban failed under the other 
prongs of the Central Hudson test, as it was not found to be narrowly tailored 
to directly advance the government's interest, and was more extensive than 
necessary to serve that interest.27 The Court concluded, "[w]e have no reason 
to think that strength wars, if they were to occur, would not produce the type 
of social harm that the Government hopes to prevent."28 
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the Court upheld the First 
Amendment protection of commercial speech.29  In that case, the Court 
considered Rhode Island's blanket ban on advertising that informed the public 
                                                        
21 Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). 
22 Id.; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484, 529 (1996) (citing Bd. of Tr. 
of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). 
23 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 482 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 
562). 
24 Id. (citing Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486). 
25 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 486. 
26 Id. at 485. 
27 Id. at 486. 
28 Id. at 485. 
29 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S. 484 (1996). 
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about retail prices of alcoholic beverages.30 Though the case resulted in a 
plurality opinion, the principal opinion concluded that while the government 
had a substantial interest in reducing alcohol consumption, the regulations did 
not directly advance the governmental interest asserted.31 Further, the Court 
strengthened the evidentiary support requirement of Central Hudson, 
requiring that the trial court provide findings of fact and "evidentiary support" 
that the regulation "significantly advanced" the state's interest, and noted that 
"speculation and conjecture" cannot suffice "when the state takes aim at 
accurate commercial information for paternalistic ends."32 
In light of these decisions, the intent of the Supreme Court is clear: the 
First Amendment protects commercial speech because it serves an 
informational function.33 In contrast, public discourse is protected to ensure 
forms of participation necessary to sustain democratic legitimacy.34  One 
could argue that the boundaries that separate commercial speech from public 
discourse reflect sociological judgments about whether particular forms of 
communication are valued merely as information, or instead as forms of 
                                                        
30 Id. at 489. 
31 Id. at 507–08 (plurality opinion by Stevens, J., joined by Kennedy, J., Souter, J. and 
Ginsburg, J.); id. at 532 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("As a result, even under the less 
than strict standard that generally applies in commercial speech cases, the State has 
failed to establish a 'reasonable fit' between its abridgment of speech and its 
temperance goal. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480, 
109 S. Ct. 3028, 3034–35, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989); see also Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. at 491, 115 S. Ct. at 1594 (explaining that defects in a federal 
ban on alcohol advertising are 'further highlighted by the availability of alternatives 
that would prove less intrusive to the First Amendment's protections for commercial 
speech'); Linmark, 431 U.S. at 97, 97 S. Ct. at 1620–21 (suggesting that the State use 
financial incentives or counter-speech, rather than speech restrictions, to advance its 
interests). It necessarily follows that the price advertising ban cannot survive the more 
stringent constitutional review that Central Hudson itself concluded was appropriate 
for the complete suppression of truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech. 447 U.S. 
at 566 n.9, 100 S. Ct. at 2351 n.9." 
32 Id. at 507 (Stevens, J., plurality). 
33 See Robert Post, Lecture, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 
UCLA L. Rev. 1, 14 (2000). 
34 Id. at 4. 
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communicative action that embody democratic participation.35 The distinction 
(and thus protection) of commercial speech and public discourse essentially 
turns on what it means for something to relate "solely" to economic interests, 
and can be understood to reflect judgments about "the character of the 
expressive activity" at issue.36 This, in turn, implies judgment that inevitably 
involves an evaluation of the "nature and constitutional significance of the 
larger social practice within which the activity is embedded."37 In his lecture, 
The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, Robert Post highlighted the 
difference between the protection of commercial speech and of public 
discourse: 
The reason why the First Amendment prohibits the state 
from suppressing public discourse on the grounds of its 
persuasiveness is that participation within democratic 
self-governance is understood to encompass a variety of 
social relationships, ranging from dialogue to association 
to persuasion. Within public discourse, speakers seek to 
persuade others of their point of view and in this way to 
make the state responsive to their perspective; for the 
state deliberately to disrupt this communicative 
relationship is to negate the very constitutional raison 
d'être of public discourse.38 
Post concluded that if the government can compel commercial speech, 
"which is protected to ensure 'the free flow of information and ideas'39 [. . . 
the Court] presumes that the state can diminish a speaker's persuasiveness in 
order to facilitate the dissemination of accurate information."40 But when 
commercial speech is "threatened" by public discourse, as is the case in 
                                                        
35 Id. at 56. 
36 Id. at 18. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 49. 
39  Id. at 49 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 
(1993)). 
40 Id. 
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agricultural disparagement statutes, the balance of First Amendment 
protection can be offset, favoring commercial speech over individual public 
discourse. 
B. AGRICULTURAL DISPARAGEMENT STATUTES AND THEIR 
BURDEN ON FREE SPEECH 
In the context of agribusiness, commercial speech concerns a company's 
advertising and food labeling, which require that specific information, such as 
ingredients, nutrition data, and allergy information, be printed on a product's 
label.41 The food industry has fought these laws as burdensome and as giving 
the impression of a problem, and actively lobbies for more favorable 
standards, as well as for the expansion of food disparagement statutes, or 
veggie libel laws.42  Within the food industry, the government has a 
compelling interest in protecting the reputation of agribusiness, as it feeds 
and employs citizens and brings income to the country. However, food 
disparagement statutes, which make it an actionable tort to criticize food 
products, are dangerous and unconstitutional because they can suppress free 
speech by insulating agribusiness from criticism.43 Specifically, the threat of 
being sued under agricultural disparagement statutes, which allow any 
individual on the spectrum of agribusiness, from grower to manufacturer to 
proprietor, to utilize the laws, give individuals justifiable fear of meeting the 
high threshold of proving an allegation by "reasonable and scientific 
inquiry."44  
Agricultural disparagement statutes, also known as food libel laws, food 
disparagement statutes, or veggie libel laws, make it illegal to disseminate 
misinformation about foods and also make it easier for food companies to sue 
                                                        
41 Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, Note, Liberating Commercial Speech: Product 
Labeling Controls and the First Amendment, 47 FLA. L. REV. 63, 70–71 (1995); CTR. 
FOR ECOLITERACY, supra note 3, at 80. 
42 CTR. FOR ECOLITERACY, supra note 3, at 80. 
43  Colleen Lynch, Note, Disregarding the Marketplace of Ideas: Constitutional 
Analysis of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 18 J.L. & COM. 167, 189 (1998). 
44 Id. at 181. 
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critics.45 The elements for a claim of product disparagement are set forth in 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 623A, which states: 
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the 
interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary 
loss resulting to the other if 
(a) he intends for publication of the statement to 
result in harm to interests of the other having a 
pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should 
recognize that it is likely to do so, and 
(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in 
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.46 
The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, who must present evidence that 
demonstrates loss of particular sales; but the standard is often relaxed, 
allowing plaintiffs to present evidence demonstrating reduced sales after the 
allegedly disparaging statement.47 
Certain conditions must be met for a plaintiff to succeed in a common 
law product disparagement suit.48 "First, common-law product disparagement 
requires the alleged statement be false[,]"49 or "not based on reasonable or 
scientific inquiry."50 Truth, therefore, is an absolute defense.51 Second, the 
plaintiff must show that there was a "direct and immediate" relationship 
between the publication of the statement and resulting damages.52 Third, the 
                                                        
45 CTR. FOR ECOLITERACY, supra note 3, at 80. 
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977). 
47 Lynch, supra note 43, at 168–69. 
48 Id. at 169. 
49 Id. at 181–82 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 634 (1977)). 
50 Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-1 (Supp. 1998); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. §§ 96.001-.004 (West 1997)). 
51 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 634 (1977)). 
52 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 632, 633 (1977)). 
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absolute and conditional privileges available to an individual with privileged 
information in a defamation suit are also available in a disparagement suit.53 
As such, a privileged individual can be shielded from liability in a 
disparagement suit.54 
Common law defamation is "the unprivileged publication of false and 
defamatory statements concerning a plaintiff," and can be oral (slander) or 
written or printed (libel). 55  The plaintiff must prove that the statement 
concerned him ("of and concerning requirement"), and that the statement was 
false and defamatory to his reputation.56 Historically, the burden of proof was 
placed on the plaintiff because courts assume that the plaintiff has greater 
access to information that would be used to prove that the statement was 
false.57 
Advocates of agricultural disparagement statutes claim that such statutes 
protect the industry from being criticized without substantiation, as well as 
from the financial impact of such statements.58 The stated goals of the laws 
are to prevent frivolous lawsuits against the food industry,59 but they can also 
enable food companies to avoid revealing possibly negative evidence about 
their practices and suppress individual free speech. For example, in December 
of 1990, eleven Washington State apple growers, representing some 4,700 
                                                        
53 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 624 cmt. a, 635 (1977)). 
54 Id. 
55 Lynch, supra note 43, at 170. 
56 Id. 
57 W. Paige Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 
1235 (1976) ("A plaintiff is in the best position to know the facts about his own life 
and activities that will establish falsity. A plaintiff's simple denial would perhaps be 
sufficient in the abnormal situation of a defendant who publishes statements that 
conclusively defame without providing some information that would indicate truth. If 
the defendant included information tending to indicate truth, however, the plaintiff, 
who has access to the facts of his life, can be expected to discharge the burden of 
overcoming the suspicious circumstances."). 
58 Lynch, supra note 43, at 179. 
59 Id. at 180. 
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growers in the Washington area, filed a complaint for product disparagement 
against CBS.60 The suit was based on a February 1989 segment from CBS's 
weekly news show "60 Minutes" on daminozide, a chemical growth regulator 
sprayed on apples, more commonly known by its trade name, Alar.61 The 
segment was based on a report by the National Resources Defense Council 
("NRDC"), entitled Intolerable Risk: Pesticides in Our Children's Food, 
where researchers found that scientific research had indicated that the 
chemical breaks down into unsymmetrical dimethylhyrazine ("UDMH"), a 
carcinogen.62 The suit largely concerned a statement by Ed Bradley, a "60 
Minutes" commentator, who stated that "[t]he most cancer-causing agent in 
our food supply is a substance sprayed on apples to keep them on the trees 
longer and make them look better."63 The public's response to this statement 
and the segment was severe, as sales and prices fell sharply worldwide, 
amounting to losses as high as $75 million dollars.64 CBS was ultimately 
granted summary judgment in the suit, as the court found that the growers 
were unable to prove "1) that daminozide was a potent cancer-causing agent, 
2) that daminozide was an imminent hazard, and 3) that children were most at 
risk."65 However, the case can be viewed as the impetus for enacting food 
disparagement statutes, as agricultural companies and their lobbyists began 
pushing for agricultural disparagement statutes to protect themselves.66 
Similarly, in 1999 Oprah Winfrey and her guest, vegetarian activist 
Howard Lyman, were famously sued by Texas beef producers for questioning 
the safety of hamburger meat.67 In the case, Texas cattle ranchers alleged that 
                                                        
60 Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 67 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1995). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Eileen Gay Jones, Forbidden Fruit: Talking About Pesticides and Food Safety in 
the Era of Agricultural Product Disparagement Laws, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 823, 840 
(2001) (citing Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, 67 F.3d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
64 Lynch, supra note 43, at 175. 
65 Id. at 177. 
66 Id. at 178. 
67 Texas Beef Grp. v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2000). 
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"one of [Winfrey's] guests knowingly and falsely depicted American beef as 
unsafe in the wake of the British panic over 'Mad Cow Disease.'"68 In the 
episode, which was titled the "Dangerous Food" show, Winfrey and her 
guests discussed the epidemic in Britain, symptoms and impacts of the 
disease, the threat of the disease in the United States, and initiatives started to 
prevent an outbreak in the U.S.69  After the April 1996 broadcast of 
"Dangerous Food," the cattle market across the U.S., including the Texas 
Panhandle, declined significantly,70 and though a cattle rancher appeared on 
the Oprah Winfrey Show the following week to refute the claims,71 the Texas 
Beef Group sued under Texas's equivalent of a veggie libel law72 in May of 
1996.73 After making its way through the courts, the Fifth Circuit held in 
2000 that though inflammatory and exaggerated, the comments of Winfrey 
and Lyman were not actionable under the First Amendment because they 
were based on truthful, established fact.74  Though Winfrey and Lyman 
ultimately won the case, the decision came after four years of legal battle and 
substantial sums, and led to a palpable censorship.75 After the suit was filed, 
no other program was willing to have Lyman as a guest, for fear of lawsuit.76 
Additionally, the number of exposés on industry feeding practices declined 
greatly on shows such as "60 Minutes" and "Geraldo," giving the impression 
that the Oprah show had gone "too far," and was "irresponsible," and 
effectively silencing the critics of the meat industry and USDA.77 
                                                        
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 683. 
70 Id. at 684. 
71 Id. 
72 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 96.002 (2012). 
73 Texas Beef Grp., 201 F.3d at 684. 
74 Id. at 688–89. 
75  Sheldon Rampton & John Stauber, One Hundred Percent All Beef Baloney: 
Lessons from the Oprah Trial, PR WATCH, First Quarter 1998, at 8, 11, available at 
http://www.prwatch.org/prwissues/1998Q1/oprah.html. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
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Agricultural disparagement statutes have been passed in thirteen states.78 
Though the statutes vary in terms of legislative purpose, cause of action, 
definitions, and potential damages, the statutes of Georgia, Ohio, and Texas 
exemplify the trend of agricultural disparagement within the U.S.79 Under 
Georgia's statute, agricultural disparagement occurs when an individual 
willfully or maliciously disseminates "false information that a perishable food 
product or commodity is not safe for human consumption."80  False 
information is defined as information not based upon "reasonable and reliable 
scientific inquiry, facts, or data."81 Further, any individual in the "entire chain 
from grower to consumer" may bring an action for damages,82 which must be 
"commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues."83 Georgia's 
legislature clarified their reasoning for the statute: 
[T]he production of agricultural and aquacultural food 
products and commodities constitutes an important and 
significant portion of the state economy and that it is 
imperative to protect the vitality of the agricultural and 
aquacultural economy for the citizens of this state by 
providing a cause of action for producers, marketers, or 
sellers to recover damages for the disparagement of any 
perishable product or commodity.84 
Ohio uses the same standard for actionable disparagement and has the 
same statute of limitations as Georgia.85  However, Ohio broadens its 
definition of "false information," defining it as any information "that is not 
based upon reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, or data, and that 
                                                        
78 Lynch, supra note 43, at 178. 
79 Id. at 180–83. 
80 Id. at 180–81 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §2-16-2(1) (Supp. 1998)). 
81 Id. at 181 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 2-16-2(1) (Supp. 1998)). 
82 Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. §2-16-2(3) (Supp. 1998)). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 180 (citing GA. CODE ANN. §2-16-1 (Supp. 1998)). 
85 Id. at 181 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2307.81(A) (West 1996)). 
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directly indicates that a . . . product is not safe for human consumption," and 
provides that any producer or association representing producers may bring 
an action for damages.86 The statute is particularly severe in its provisions for 
damages. If the plaintiff proves that the defendant knew or should have 
known dissemination of information was false, the defendants may be 
awarded compensatory and punitive damages, as well as reasonable attorney's 
fees and court costs.87 Further, any person who intentionally disparages an 
agricultural product, and does so intending to harm the producers of that 
product, is liable for treble damages as well.88 The reasoning behind the state 
of Ohio's statute is similar to Georgia's: 
[T]he production of agricultural and aquacultural food 
products constitute an important and significant portion 
of the economy of this state . . . [T]he dissemination . . . 
of false information about the safety of Ohio's food 
supply would be extremely detrimental to Ohio's 
economy, the welfare of the consuming public, and the 
producers of agricultural and aquacultural food products. 
Accordingly, it is the intent of the general assembly . . . 
to benefit all the citizens of this state and protect the 
vitality of the agricultural and aquacultural economy by 
providing a cause of action for producers of perishable 
. . . products to recover damages for the disparagement of 
such food products.89 
Texas's disparagement statute was enacted in response to Texas Beef 
Group v. Winfrey, above.90 In contrast with Georgia and Ohio, Texas does not 
state its purpose or legislative aim. Under the statute,91 a person is liable if: 
"(1) the person disseminates in any manner information relating to a 
                                                        
86 Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2307.81(B)(2), (C) (West 1998)). 
87 Id. at 182 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 2307.81(C) West 1998)). 
88 Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§2307.81(E) (West 1998)). 
89 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.81(A) (West Supp. 2012). 
90 See Tex. Beef Grp., 201 F.3d at 687. 
91 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 96.001-.004 (West 2011). 
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perishable food product to the public; (2) the person knows the information is 
false; and (3) the information states or implies that the perishable food 
product is not safe for consumption by the public."92 To decide whether the 
disseminated information was false, "the trier of fact shall consider whether 
the information was based on reasonable and reliable scientific inquiry, facts, 
or data."93 The Texas false disparagement section does not consider punitive 
damages, providing only for "damages" generally. Rather, the section 
employs a high standard of culpability for dissemination of the information: 
"to be liable, the individual must have had actual knowledge or stated or 
implied that the product was unsafe."94 However, the statute does not assign a 
burden of proof.95 
Auvil v. CBS 60 Minutes, Texas Beef Group v. Winfrey, and the 
agricultural disparagement statutes above are just a few examples of the 
power agribusiness wields. In fact, under current standards, it would be 
permissible to disseminate false, positive statements as part of commercial 
speech in food labeling (e.g., "Eating apples will make you live to the age of 
100.").96 However, it would not be permissible to disseminate true statements 
that were harmful to agriculture if they were not supported by "a reasonable 
and scientific inquiry" (e.g. "Chemicals on apples can cause cancer.").97 Thus, 
comments with a positive but false viewpoint toward agriculture can survive, 
while those critical of agriculture will likely be struck down. This can be 
viewed as blatant suppression of individual freedom of speech, and is 
therefore invalid.98 Agricultural disparagement statutes were by their very 
nature designed to relax the burdens of proof allocated for plaintiffs in 
                                                        
92 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002-.003 (West 2011). 
93 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.003 (West 2011). 
94 Id. at 183 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 96.002(b) (West 2011)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 188. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 187 ("These standards create a per se falsity based upon a lack of hard 
scientific proof and are far below the constitutional requirements."). 
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defamation litigation,99 while increasing the burden of proof for defendants 
by requiring that allegations be based on "reasonable and reliable scientific 
inquiry."100 Further, because state agricultural disparagement statutes create a 
new category of libel solely concerning agriculture, the laws are invalid 
because states may not privilege certain commodities by prohibiting 
individuals from exercising their First Amendment rights.101 
With the Supreme Court decisions on commercial speech in Rubin and 
44 Liquormart, and the states' implementation of agricultural disparagement 
statutes, the "free flow of information and ideas"102  now runs only from 
agribusiness to consumer. By enforcing agricultural disparagement statutes as 
they currently stand, the state has deliberately disrupted the communicative 
relationship between buyer and seller, and left individuals unprotected and 
threatened by the statutes. As a result, individuals may not participate in 
public discourse, which impacts our democratic legitimacy and the "very 
constitutional raison d'être of public discourse."103 
Similar to Rubin and 44 Liquormart, agricultural disparagement statutes 
serve a legitimate state interest, but fail in the subsequent prongs of the 
Central Hudson test. Agricultural disparagement statutes protect the 
government's legitimate interest in restricting the type of slanderous speech 
that would unduly harm agribusiness. However, agricultural disparagement 
statutes are not narrowly tailored to directly advance the government's 
interest, as the burden of proof that they impose upon the defendant is unduly 
burdensome, and thus more extensive than necessary to serve the asserted 
interest. Though the harms that agricultural disparagement statutes seek to 
protect against are real, rather than speculative, the statutes do not directly 
achieve the asserted interest, but rather unduly restrict individual free speech 
                                                        
99  David J. Bederman et al., Of Banana Bills and Veggie Hate Crimes: The 
Constitutionality of Agricultural Disparagement Statutes, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 135, 
157 (1997). 
100 Id. at 147. 
101 Id. at 157. 
102 Post, supra note 33, at 49. 
103 Id. 
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by striking fear in the minds of individuals. In their current state, agricultural 
disparagement statutes take aim at individuals' legitimate concerns about the 
health and safety of their food, restricting the amount of information available 
in a paternalistic and harmful fashion. 
Agricultural disparagement statutes should protect against defamation 
and libel. Using the common law standard, the burden would be on the 
plaintiff to prove that the alleged "agriculturally-disparaging" statement was 
false and defamatory to the reputation of agribusiness. In their current state, 
agricultural disparagement statutes shift the burden to the individual 
defendant, who likely has less access to the information to support that the 
statements were not only true, but to meet the higher burden of proof that the 
statements be "supported by a reasonable and scientific inquiry." This results 
in an imposition of liability upon individuals for every misstatement, which 
has the potential to deter not only false speech, but truth as well. 
Additionally, the possibility that individuals might have to prove everything 
they question in the spectrum of agribusiness, from the seed, to the farmers, 
to the board of directors, can lead to self-censorship and the subsequent 
deprivation of the public to free speech. 
C. INSULATING AGRIBUSINESS FROM CRITICISM 
Agricultural commercial speech has contributed to consumers being 
unaware of the details of food production, as part of a concerted effort by 
businesses and lobbyists to craft and protect the image of their products as 
commercial speech, to hold on to intellectual property, and avoid giving more 
detailed labels or warnings on their food products. Our romanticized idea of 
farming is of small farms with blue skies, red barns, and animals grazing in 
green pastures. But the reality is that industrial factory farms have 
questionable policies concerning the environment,104  animals,105  and food 
                                                        
104 See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 274–93 (2000). 
105 See David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of 
Animals Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 ANIMAL L. 123, 125 (1996). 
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safety.106 There is an emphasis on production and profit and de-emphasis on 
the health and safety of workers and of the product.107 In this factory farming 
model, a single, large agricultural corporation may hire farmers as 
independent contractors, whereby the farmer's livelihood is dependent on the 
corporation, which in turn dictates all aspects of production in order to 
produce a uniform product as efficiently as possible.108 
Factory farms rely on government subsidies, causing fast, processed 
food to be cheaper than healthier foods like fruits and vegetables.109 Over 
time, lobbyists have successfully influenced the federal government to spend 
$35 billion each year to subsidize certain commodity crops such as corn and 
soybeans, which has artificially lowered their prices.110 This has resulted in a 
great amount of encouragement for farmers to grow cheap subsidy crops, 
which can be used widely in processed foods, and little encouragement to 
grow specialty crops like fruits and vegetables.111  In addition, many past 
agribusiness employees are current government regulators because of their 
knowledge of the industry.112 However, regulators may face a conflict of 
interest if they know individuals in the industry.113 Though this is the case 
throughout government, the strength of the American Farm Bureau 
Federation has become one of the most powerful lobbying forces in the 
nation, opposing government regulation of farms and providing strength for 
favorable legislation, including agricultural disparagement statutes.114 
                                                        
106 See James T. O'Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA's Second Century: Judicial 
Review, Politics, and A Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 
946, 949 (2008). 
107 CTR. FOR ECOLITERACY, supra note 3, at 64. 
108 Id. at 24. 
109 Id. at 48. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 81. 
113 Id. 
114 Ruhl, supra note 104, at 332. 
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Agricultural disparagement statutes are intended to protect producers' 
businesses and their families, but their effect insulates agribusiness from 
criticism. 115  There is a legitimate governmental and collective interest in 
protecting agriculture, such as "guard[ing] valuable trade secrets, 
minimiz[ing] unnecessary fear in consumers, which could create panic; and 
keep[ing] costs down by blocking frivolous lawsuits."116 However, when the 
government allows one perspective on an issue while blocking other 
perspectives on that issue, it violates the principles of the First 
Amendment.117 Similarly, suppressing individuals' speech because its content 
reveals detrimental information is contrary to our idea of democracy, as it 
permits the perspective of agribusiness, while disallowing the perspective of 
individuals. To consumers, this can be seen as a "veil" that "does more than 
protect the food system—it protects companies at the expense of 
consumers."118 
While protecting our agricultural industry from unfounded defamatory 
claims is a worthy endeavor, agricultural disparagement statutes suppress free 
speech, which is vital to the growth of our society, and in turn the safety and 
health of our food.119 First, the amorphous requirements of disparagement 
and defamation allow any person in the chain of agribusiness to bring a claim 
for remarks that did not directly concern or harm them.120 Thus, the First 
Amendment is eroded as the statutes suppress the speech of individuals who 
refrain from bringing claims out of fear that some unidentified and 
unintended party will institute an action.121 Secondly, the standard that the 
statement is false if not "supported by a reasonable and scientific inquiry" is 
too high, as it shifts the burden of proving truthfulness to the defendant, 
                                                        
115 See Lynch, supra note 43, at 184–85. 
116 CTR. FOR ECOLITERACY, supra note 3, at 81. 
117 Brielle C. Goldfaden, Comment, "Choose Life" Plates: The States' License to 
Discriminate Based on Viewpoint, 5 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 279, 299 (2008). 
118 CTR. FOR ECOLITERACY, supra note 3, at 81. 
119 Lynch, supra note 43, at 184. 
120 Id. at 185. 
121 Id. at 186. 
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which can suppress the free speech of those fearing inability to meet that high 
burden of proof.122 Third, veggie libel statutes suppress specific content of 
speech—namely, those statements that cannot be supported by "a reasonable 
and scientific inquiry" and are detrimental to the food industry, and are thus 
unconstitutional.123 
II. FOLLOW THE MONEY: CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC 
In January 2010, the Supreme Court held in Citizens United v. FEC that 
the ban on independent corporate funded "electioneering communications" 
violated the First Amendment on its face.124 With this decision, "corporations 
are now free to make unlimited independent express advocacy expenditures 
in federal elections."125 The case can be seen as disregarding the compelling 
public interest that political elections are free from the influence of unlimited 
funding from corporations, as corporations now have greater power than the 
people, which will allow them to assert their interest and relegate the interests 
of the people to the sidelines.126 With this decision, the Supreme Court has 
ignored over one hundred years of precedent, disregarding the established 
compelling governmental interest in preventing "the corrosive and distorting 
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help 
of the corporate form, and that have little or no correlation to the public's 
support for the corporation's ideas."127  Unlike § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt 
organizations which are prohibited from having any "substantial part" of their 
activities consist of carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to 
                                                        
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 187–88. 
124 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876. 
125 Elizabeth Getman, Citizens United: Latest Campaign Finance Decision Creates 
More Gray Areas, 35-SPG ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 13, at 13 (Spring 2010). 
126 Rubin, supra note 4, at 584. 
127 Id. at 550 (citing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 652 
(1990)). 
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influence legislation,128  Citizens United has granted agribusiness specifi-
cally—and corporations in general—an exponential increase of influence in 
American life, and the near elimination of the power of the state to regulate 
corporations in their exercise of First Amendment rights.129 
Viewing the agricultural debate in terms of collectivist and individualist 
philosophy, Citizens United reflects the deterioration of emphasis on First 
Amendment rights through a skewed perception of individualist thinking and 
collectivist thinking. Individualist philosophy encompasses the idea that all 
people possess rights that predate government, that government's role is to 
protect those rights completely and without favor, and that rights, or 
principles, are based on fundamental moral concepts such as justice.130 
Collectivist thought promotes the idea that free speech is granted by society, 
agreed upon by its members, and benefits the greater good.131 Under the guise 
of collectivist thinking, the Supreme Court has further strengthened special 
interest corporations such as agribusiness by easing limits on campaign 
spending to fund their interests and allowing for the influence of outcomes 
with electioneering. This decision also tramples individualist thinking by 
asserting that special interests are on equal footing with individuals 
concerning free speech, which runs afoul of the principles of fairness and 
equal justice our country was founded upon. 
                                                        
128 John J. Silver, Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Nonprofit Organizations: An 
Overview, 24 COLO. LAW. 2157 (1995). 
129 Rubin, supra note 4, at 584. 
130 Elizabeth Banks Hindman, Note, Protecting Childhood: Rights, Social Goals and 
the First Amendment in the Context of the Child Online Protection Act, 15 COMM. L. 
& POL'Y 1, 4 (2010). 
131 Id. at 5. 
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III. THE SOLUTION: TRANSPARENCY, CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND 
DISCLOSURE 
A. TRANSPARENCY IN AGRIBUSINESS 
Suing for defamation under agricultural disparagement statutes only 
promotes the idea that agribusiness is hiding behind a veil. In order to move 
towards a safer and healthier state of food politics, agribusiness must allow 
for exercise of individual speech, free from the threat of agricultural 
disparagement statutes. One would hope that this will lead to food safety 
activists and agribusiness companies engaging in healthy debate, allowing for 
research and investigation on the state of farming and food production in our 
country, improving public policies and allowing consumers to make informed 
decisions. 
B. CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND DISCLOSURE 
To remedy the disparity of free speech, Congress must consider passing 
legislation that blunts the impact of Citizens United and also speaks to the 
larger problem of special interests dominating the political process. The Fair 
Elections Now Act (H.R. 1404 and S. 750), which was reintroduced in 2011, 
would end the reliance on campaign cash from special interests, "allow[ing] 
federal candidates to choose to run for office without relying on large 
contributions, big money bundlers, or donations from lobbyists . . . [and 
freeing them] from the constant fundraising in order to focus on what people 
in their communities want" by establishing a fund for the benefit of 
candidates who receive support from their states.132 To qualify, a candidate 
would first raise a "large number of small contributions," limited to $100.133 
Once the candidate reached 1,500 contributions and a total of $50,000, he or 
she would qualify for Fair Elections funding in the primary, continuing into 
the general election if the candidate won the primary.134 
                                                        
132  Summary of Fair Elections Now Act, FAIR ELECTIONS NOW (Mar. 7, 2012), 
http://fairelectionsnow.org/about-bill. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
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Ten percent of the primary Fair Elections funding would also need to be 
raised by a U.S. Senate candidate through small contributions, as state 
populations vary.135 This number would be equal to "2,000 plus 500 times the 
number of congressional districts in [the candidate's] state."136 For example, 
"[a] candidate running for U.S. Senate in Ohio, with 18 districts, would 
require 11,000 qualifying contributions before receiving Fair Elections 
funding."137  For House candidates, this would amount to $1,050,000 in 
funding, split into forty percent for the primary, and sixty percent for the 
general. 138  Senate candidates would receive $1.25 million, plus another 
$250,000 per congressional district in each state; split forty percent for the 
primary, and sixty percent for the general.139 If candidates continued to raise 
small donations from their home state in the general election, they would also 
be eligible for additional matching Fair Elections funds.140 The Fair Elections 
Fund would contribute five dollars for every dollar raised by donations of 
$100 or less from contributors from the candidate's home state.141 In total, the 
Funds available will be limited to "three times the initial allocation for the 
primary, and again for the general, available only to candidates who raise a 
significant amount of small donations from their home state."142 
Candidates could still utilize political action committees, but would be 
limited to a $100 limit for each individual per year.143 Additionally, if a 
qualifying candidate "is facing a well-financed or self-financed opponent, or 
is the target of an independent expenditure, they will be able to respond by 
                                                        
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
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utilizing this matching fund provision."144 Funding for Senate races would be 
raised by imposing a small fee on large government contractors, based on a 
percentage of the contract. Funding for House races "would come from ten 
percent of revenues generated through the auction of unused broadcast 
spectrum."145 Qualifying candidates would also receive a 20% reduction in 
the lowest broadcast rates, while Senate candidates would receive $100,000 
in media vouchers per congressional district, and House candidates would 
receive a $100,000 media voucher. 146  Both of these benefits could be 
exchanged for cash with their national party committee. In total, the new 
system could cost between $700 and $850 million per year.147 
The Fair Elections Now Act supplements the DISCLOSE (Democracy is 
Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in Elections) (H.R. 5175 and S. 
3628) bill, which would mix disclosure and place restrictions on certain types 
of independent expenditures by requiring organizations involved in political 
campaigning to disclose the identity of large donors, to reveal their identities 
in any political ads they fund, and bar foreign corporations, government 
contractors, and TARP recipients from making political expenditures.148 
Together, these acts can bring us closer to a more equitable form of 
campaigning, by reducing our candidates' dependence on corporations and 
special interests by giving the individual candidate a voice, and requiring 
transparency. Campaign finance disclosure methods will allow citizens to 
make informed decisions, as they will be empowered by the release of data 
through methods such as aggregate disclosure.149  Aggregate disclosure 
obscures the identities of individual donors, protecting against harassment 
                                                        
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Memorandum from Public Campaign and Common Cause to Editorial Writers and 
Interested Journalists, regarding The DISCLOSE Act and Fair Elections (Mar. 7, 
2012) (on file at http://www.publicampaign.org/pressroom/2010/05/03/memo-the-
disclose-act-and-fair-elections). 
149  Scott M. Noveck, Note, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative 
Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 108 (Winter 2010). 
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and retaliation, while providing patterns of rich and politically valuable 
information, which can help to protect against corruption.150 This form of 
disclosure can reveal patterns of political support and help to prevent bribery 
and retaliation in politics.151 Together, the Fair Elections Now Act and the 
DISCLOSE Act will allow candidates to run competitive races without 
relying on special interests; once again empowering individuals with free 
speech by preventing corporations, such as agribusiness, from determining 
the outcome of elections.  
CONCLUSION 
Suppression of individual free speech involves an imbalance of political 
and legal power, leading one group to have superior speech rights over 
another. To achieve the freedom of speech that our forefathers envisioned, we 
must balance the weight placed on individual and corporate free speech, 
placing limits on corporations to lessen the type of corruption that can arise 
after Citizens United. By enacting legislation such as the DISCLOSE and Fair 
Elections Now Acts, we will return to a more equitable form of campaigning, 
whereby individuals honor "the commitment to robust debate on public 
issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by extending 
constitutional protection to all discussion and communication involving 
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons 
involved are famous or anonymous."152  This will revive full freedom of 
speech, allowing individuals to freely question food products without fear of 
punishment under agricultural disparagement statutes. 
                                                        
150 Id. at 108. 
151 Id. 
152 Lynch, supra note 43, at 171 (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 44 
(1971)). 
 
